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party organization, its major participants, and the tone and content of its 
electoral appeals may, in the final analysis, be the real key to a fuller com-
prehension of its fate. 
W. G. GODFREY 
THREE BOOKS ON NOVA SCOTIA'S ECONOMY 
Three volumes make up the "Atlantic Provinces Studies" series, which the 
Social Science Research Council of Canada devised in 1959.1 The Atlantic 
Provinces Economic Council had asked the SSRCC to do something about 
research on their domain and funds came from the Canada Council and from 
other government bodies. Why only three Studies in thirteen years? Were 
there no funds for more? Were Atlantic social scientists so involved in con-
tract research that they had little time for "fundamental studies of their own 
choosing" (Graham, p. ix)? Or, as other Canadians sometimes suspect, do 
the conditions in Atlantic universities simply discourage serious research? 
The reviewer can only record his puzzlement, and his regret that more work 
has not appeared. 
Time has done strange things to the three books. All three authors draw 
their material from the fifties and very early sixties. George's observations 
cover the period 1946-62. Graham's account of fiscal arrangements really 
ends in 1963, and its emphasis is on the 1950's, when Nova Scotia was experi-
menting with "foundation programmes" in education and with other devices 
for financing roads and health. Sears, perhaps, has suffered most. Though 
his work was published in 1972, it is based on field research which ended in 
1961. Only the authors, or their graduate students, can tell us whether the 
descriptions of a distant reality still apply. This question is important, be-
cause to prescribe for Nova Scotia's economic ills we must correctly perceive 
its present economic and social reality. 
Graham's work is the most varied and ambitious. Besides describing and 
appraising the fiscal relations between Nova Scotia and its municipalities, 
he offers a sketch of Nova Scotia's economic development and an explanation 
of its poverty. With respect to growth and poverty various waves of opinion 
have passed over professional economists in the past decade, waves which 
have undermined the foundations of Graham's edifice, though they have not 
yet destroyed them. Graham thinks that Nova Scotia is poor because it has 
poor natural resources and because it uses all inputs rather badly. No one 
1 John F. Graham, Fiscal Adjustment and Economic Development: a Case Study of Nova Scotia 
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963); Roy E. George, A Leader and a Laggard: Manu-
facturing Industry in Nova Scotia, Quebec and Ontario (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
1970); John T. Sears, Institutional Financing of Small Business in Nova Scotia (Toronto, Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 1972). 
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would quarrel with the latter statement. The former is more disputable. 
In the "sources-of-growth" analyses which were so fashionable in the 1960's, 
natural resources never made much of a contribution.2 These analyses are 
now somewhat discredited, for it has become more fashionable to stress 
produced means of production — plant, equipment, and inventories. The 
extraordinary economic performance of Japan has also cast a good deal of 
doubt upon the general proposition that a region must be poor because it 
is deficient in natural resources. Finally, "cliometric" work never seems to 
succeed in crediting much growth or prosperity to the natural resource base. 
After all, resources do move in international and interregional trade; why, 
then, should a local deficiency be so serious? 
Strictly speaking, the source-of-growth analyses are not relevant to the ex-
planation of interregional income levels. But if aggregate or per-capita growth 
is not closely linked to natural resource endowments, one might think that 
a resource-deficient area could, by concentrating on the things which do 
raise output and output per capita, catch up with the better-endowed regions. 
The sources-of-growth studies have directed our attention to education, and 
to the rates at which technical changes are produced and introduced. We 
now know that if the costs of extra education are compared with the pro-
ductivity of this education, much educational outlay is found to be a bad 
social investment. We also know that to benefit from technical change we 
must build new plant and equipment which "embodies" the new, lower-cost 
techniques. Hence most of us are nervous about the "sources-of-growth" 
exercises, and we are increasingly interested in physical investment — the 
accumulation of new plant and equipment. In really backward countries, 
matters may be different. But in Western-style societies which are fairly well-
schooled and not really very retarded, it is hard to avoid two impressions. 
First, high investment causes a rapid growth not only of output but also of 
productivity and therefore of income per capita and of competitiveness. 
Second, such investment can quickly swamp the disadvantage of a bad re-
source base, so long as raw materials are traded between regions on reason-
ably favourable terms. However, if the investment is wrongly directed or if 
the new plants are ill-staffed and ill-managed, high investment will not do as 
much as it otherwise might. 
These ideas have little place in Graham's scheme. He does emphasise that 
it is important to use all inputs effectively. But this discussion, like most of 
the book, is coloured by his use of the "marginal productivity theory" as 
a normative principle with which one can discover a correct static allocation 
of all inputs — land, labour, raw materials, and capital. If all businessmen 
have perfect knowledge of all production possibilities and if all inputs are 
free to move from place to place and from use to use, then an economy is 
2 See, for example, among many others, N.H. Lithwick, Economic Growth in Canada: a Quan-
titative Analysis (Toronto. 1967) or E.F. Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ (Washington. 1967). 
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producing the maximum output when it has so allocated each input that the 
last unit of each input in each use produces the same output value as in any 
other use. Thus from such a position one cannot re-allocate inputs without 
reducing output; it seems to follow that inputs are "optimally" allocated, 
and that output is also "optimal" — that is, among other things, it is as large 
as possible. Hence poverty must reflect ignorance, misallocation, and/or a 
bad endowment of one or more inputs. And the policy maker should concen-
trate upon removing the ignorance and reallocating the inputs; almost by de-
finition, he cannot affect their quantities. Taxes, outlays, and government 
grants then have a logical place: one can assess and prescribe on the basis of 
the marginal productivity principle. Although Graham also follows other 
lines of enquiry, this is largely what he does. Public finance is "good" in so 
far as it helps to produce an optimal allocation of inputs, and "bad" in so far 
as it does not. Graham does not ignore "fairness" or "ability to pay", but it 
is this "efficiency" with which he is most concerned. 
The marginal productivity principle looks attractive. Unfortunately, it 
is flawed by logical difficulties which are so profound as to disable it. More 
regrettably, it directs our attention to the wrong things. For it is a normative 
approach to the correct allocating of given inputs. Yet neither kind of change 
is consistent with the "efficient" static equilibrium with which marginal pro-
ductivity theory deals, and the theory does not tell us how to plan these 
changes. This is not to criticise Graham's assessment of Nova Scotia's fiscal 
system. If a rather poor province is trying to maintain a rather high level of 
public service on a very restricted tax base, it must carefully scrutinise its 
spending and its grants. Graham's scrutiny is thoughtful, sensible, and ex-
tremely helpful. The point is that such scrutiny has a small growth-payoff. 
It is often believed that by providing "infrastructure" — roads, ports, util-
ities — a government could create conditions in which private investment 
would flourish. But Graham is not concerned with the level of such spending; 
he is interested in the means by which province and municipalities can share 
it. And George shows that in Nova Scotia no amount of infrastructure-
building or subsidisation could offset the province's higher production costs. 
Hence with respect to the traditional services that Graham considers — 
roads, education, public health, welfare, and local services — the only sen-
sible course is to control the input-cost of a given quality-level, so as to re-
lease inputs for consumption and accumulation. Graham's comments on 
grant-formulae are helpful to this end. But administrative changes might help 
as much, or more. 
The real task is to encourage higher investment in the activities where, 
for thirty years or more, technical change has been most rapid. All three 
of our authors assume that such investment must occur chiefly in manu-
facturing, and that much of it must come from small and/or new businesses. 
Neither assumption need be true. For example, I really cannot see why the 
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Maritimes should not own and man a steel, seagoing merchant marine, even 
if they cannot competitively build the necessary ships. The Norwegians made 
the transition from sail to steam, and the Japanese, with no prior tradition 
of long voyages, became a major mercantile power. Why can Nova Scotians 
not do likewise? But shipowning requires money, and so does a new factory. 
Hence the importance of Sears' work. 
Sears tells us that he began by studying the small businesses themselves, 
but that he was obliged to concentrate instead upon the financial institu-
tions — the Industrial Development Bank, Industrial Estates Ltd., the In-
dustrial Loan Fund, industrial finance firms, credit unions, factors, insurance 
companies, and especially the chartered banks, to which half his book is 
devoted. He estimates that between 75 and 100 small Nova Scotia firms had 
"unsatisfied credit needs". But with the banks he encountered a problem both 
serious and symptomatic: because so few managers had ever made a loan to 
a new or small business, he was obliged to ask, "What would you do if . . ."? 
The interviews convinced him that new businesses would have trouble getting 
bank credit, and that local managers were ill-informed, conservative, and 
incompetent in their appraisal of risk and payoff. However, he believed that 
Roynat and Industrial Estates go far to fill the "gap" with respect to medium-
term credit that bankers' habits would otherwise create. But of course it is 
one thing to offer funds, and another to take them up. Maritime banks are 
net creditors of their head offices; small Maritime businesses are reluctant 
to borrow, "not well versed in financial management, and . . . not aggressive" 
(p. 221). 
Both Sears and George rely heavily upon interview material. George 
marshals this information with the most varied statistical material to answer 
this question: could a Nova Scotia factory supply Upper Canada less expen-
sively than an Ontario or Quebec one? To answer this question, George 
considers all the several elements of production and transport costs. He 
works systematically through the elements in total delivered costs, consid-
ering labour, materials and fuel, electricity, capital, product transportation, 
and local taxation. He concludes (p. 98) that in 1962, on the average, the 
cost of supplying an Upper Canada market would have been some 4% higher 
if the factory was in Nova Scotia than if it had been in Quebec or Ontario. 
However, he then shows that if as much as 9% of Nova Scotia output is sold 
in the Atlantic region, and if labour were as efficient in Nova Scotia as in 
Quebec and Ontario, the costs would be almost exactly the same. Since Nova 
Scotia industry does market 9% of its output in the Atlantic region, and since 
multiplant firms find that Nova Scotia labour is as productive as Ontario or 
Quebec labour, he argues that the inefficiency of local Nova Scotia owners 
and managers causes the province's cost-disadvantage, and therefore its 
industrial retardation vis-a-vis Upper Canada. 
Better management would not necessarily close the earnings gap. It would 
Acadiensis 109 
simply bring local productivity in line with local earnings, thus encouraging 
the growth of local manufacturing. But this growth ought to generate the 
cumulative process which we sketched above; hence in time Nova Scotia 
earnings ought to rise relative to those elsewhere in Canada. The manage-
ment problem cannot be treated by doses of education, since the province 
already exports many of its university graduates. Indeed all three of our 
authors attribute some of the local managerial backwardness to this drain 
of the young and the bright. Recalling Max Aitken or R. B. Bennett, one 
can only agree. Both Sears and George do think education can do something. 
Sears is the more optimistic, and the more demanding. The chartered banks 
must upgrade their staffs by making more interregional transfers, providing 
more inservice training, and recruiting more university men and women. 
Though equally interested in education, George is more pessimistic about 
its payoff: social attitudes, he tells us, are so slow to change that for a gen-
eration or more the payoff will be small. 
Nova Scotia costs are nearly competitive, but Nova Scotia entrepreneurs 
are inept or unimaginative. George's prescription is reasonable: deliberate 
and heavy cost-subsidisation, especially through Industrial Estates. George 
shows that "foreign" entrepreneurs are very ignorant of Nova Scotia. Pre-
sumably, therefore, most of them would ignore any new subsidies, and both 
he and Sears agree that local entrepreneurs are no more likely to respond. 
Probably one should try the subsidies, and the re-education, but one will 
not get any rapid results unless the government itself actually builds and 
operates some new manufacturing plant. I am not thinking of rescue oper-
ations, needful though they may be, but of novelty. 
Governments can hire the technicians and managers. They need not try 
to create entrepreneurs. They need not demand any profit, though they 
should probably try to cover costs and to earn interest on the capital funds 
which the projects would absorb. Nor need they worry about the source of 
these funds. Ever since 1935 the Bank of Canada has had the power to buy 
provincial bonds. Might the Atlantic governments not convince the Dominion 
that, as part of an industrialisation programme, the Bank should at last begin 
to do so? What might government build? Any projects should be labour-
using, either directly or indirectly. George explains how important this is 
for a labour-rich, capital-poor area. In addition, they might well fit into one 
of two categories. First, governments might produce standardised, homo-
geneous products for external markets. The obvious choice would be pulp 
and paper, where market prospects are now very good. Surely there are 
others. For instance, is it utterly impossible to build ships at competitive 
prices for export, and, if so, why? The point about such goods is that they 
slide neatly and impersonally into the existing channels of interregional 
and international trade. They are not technically risky, nor must they create 
a new demand among consumers; they can sell on price and technical char-
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acter, not on design or advertising. Second, governments might try to pro-
duce more of the things which they themselves use. Such "import-replace-
ment" is attractive. The external "supply price" serves as an objective which 
local production must match, or better. So do the technical standards of the 
"imports". Yet the local market can be assured. 
Perhaps such a plan is politically unrealistic. If so, Atlantic notables will 
quickly tell us. Certainly the plan has risks — high-cost production, dupli-
cation, featherbedding, undue influence, and simple graft. But so do the 
many schemes by which Maritime manufacturers are already aided. And 
if the new plants could be inter-governmental, their markets would be larger 
and their uncertainties somewhat fewer. Whether or not the plan is worth 
investigating, it is interesting that though George, Sears, and Graham do not 
make any such suggestion their evidence leads one to do so, and their analy-
ses make it look attractive. 
IAN M. DRUMMOND 
NEW AND OLD HISTORY IN ONTARIO 
"Ontario historians have never had a problem", the editor of Acadiensis 
has written, "for research into an Ontario topic is considered of national 
importance while similar research into the peripheral areas of Confeder-
ation is not".1 What may appear not to be a problem at the periphery is in 
fact a major pitfall for historians of Ontario. Undeniably, Ontario, imperial 
in bearing and ubiquitous in influence, looms above the other provinces 
in Canadian history texts, which are so often written by Ontario natives 
or residents. But in the historian's concentration upon Ontario as an actor 
in the national system, we have learned remarkably little about Ontario it-
self. The historian's vision of Ontario, like the province itself, has shunned 
introspection. 
Thus, while British Columbia is the subject of two recent provincial his-
tories, Ontario is the subject of none.2 Nor has the curious fascination with ab-
errant behaviour on the part of Canadian historians, a rather conformist 
lot themselves, led to a thorough and coherent investigation of Ontario's 
political, administrative, and socio-economic structure as has occurred 
with Alberta, thanks to Social Credit, and, to a lesser extent, with Saskatche-
1 P.A. Buckner, "Acadiensis II", Acadiensis, I (Autumn, 1971), p. 4. 
2 Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia (Toronto, 1958) and Martin Robin, The Rush for Spoils: 
The Company Province, 1871-1933 (Toronto, 1972); Pillars of Profit: The Company Province, 
1934-1972 (Toronto, 1973). The text normally assigned in Ontario History courses is Profiles 
of a Province (Toronto, 1967), a collection of essays. 
